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ABSTRACT 
 
Our world economy is constantly changing and within the process, new market 
players have started emerging and transforming international trade relations. 
Furthermore, multilateral organizations have become more important than ever for 
developed and developing countries as common forums to discuss international 
treaties and to resolve trade disputes. Within this context, Brazil in particular has 
experienced a positive transformation of its economy during the last 40 years, and has 
now become a new economic power guiding emerging economies in their strategic 
use of the international trade legal system. This study analyzes three particular issues 
that are common to developing countries within the World Trade Organization 
(WTO): agricultural subsidies, anti-dumping, and the TRIPS Agreement, with a 
particular focus on the negotiation process with developed countries and the various 
outcomes obtained. The study illustrates Brazil’s influence on the role of the 
developing countries in light of each of the common issues examined, by presenting 
examples of trade disputes taken before the WTO where Brazil has had direct 
participation and obtained a positive result. This paper argues that the WTO continues 
to be an agent for economic development given its platform to provide the third world 
with the opportunity to both discuss trade agreements at an international level, and to 
participate in a neutral system for trade dispute settlement. In addition, this paper 
recognizes that the WTO remains a strategic option to influence global international 
trade as with the example of Brazil. While this study highlights the fact that Brazil has 
achieved particular milestones on its own and as a result has helped develop the role 
of emerging economies within the international trade arena, it also emphasizes the 
need for each of the developing countries to confront their own specific challenges in 
order to realize economic development, as Brazil did. Brazil has been and can be a 
great example for the developing world within the WTO framework, but it certainly is 
not the only solution to all developing world problems. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Currently Brazil is recognized globally as an economic and political leader within the 
Latin American region, where countries have not yet succeeded in the strengthening 
of their economies. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Brazil was 
classified as the seventh biggest economy in the world in 2012 with a GDP of 2.4 
trillion U.S. dollars and it has been ranked fourth for GDP growth projections for 
2013, with a 3.5% expected increase following China (8.2%), India (5.9%) and Russia 
(3.7%).1 Considering that the positive results are mostly due to the country’s 
international trade these statistics raise an important question: How is Brazil’s Trading 
Policy impacting the role of developing countries in the international economic arena 
and particularly within the scope of the World Trade Organization (WTO)? 
 
Brazil has been able to build up and fortify its economy during the last decade 
because of its transition over the past forty years from a protectionist model to a trade 
liberalization platform/program in the international market, and also because of the 
structural change in the role of the Brazilian State within its economy and its society.2 
 
Two significant milestone periods can be identified in the evolution of 
Brazilian Trade Policy: Firstly, National Developmentalism that started in the 1930s 
with the Industrialization process, and that established the State as the focal point of 
the economy and introduced Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) as a pillar of 
trade policy at that time.3 Secondly, New Developmentalism that started as a 
consequence of the global financial crisis in 1980, and that resulted in the 
liberalization of the Brazilian economy in the 1990s.  Brazil’s international trade was 
transformed after the liberalization, most notably during the government of 
                                                
1 See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (October 2012, updated January 2013). 
2 See Glauco Arbix & Scott B. Martin, Beyond Developmentalism and Market Fundamentalism in 
Brazil: Inclusionary State Activism without Statism, paper presented at the workshop on “States, 
Development, and Global Governance”, University of Wisconsin (2010), available at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/paper_arbix.pdf  
3 See also Celso Furtado, Una Economia Dependente (1956); Hans Singer, Postwar Relations between 
Under-developed and Industrialized Countries (1949); Raul Prebisch, Raul Prebisch on Latin 
American Development (1981); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial 
Transformation (1995). 
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Ignacio Lula da Silva from 2003 to 2011, which reoriented and advanced Brazilian 
Trade Policies to what they are today.  
 
Through this evolution process, Brazil has taken its place as one of the new 
key players in today’s world economy together with countries such as Russia, India 
and China, the BRIC countries. Brazil has established itself as one of these newly 
developed economies that have started influencing markets and playing a central role 
in multilateral trade negotiations affecting the third world. 
 
Within the framework of WTO multilateral trade negotiations, Brazil has 
adopted a defensive position of its economic interests reflected in the various cases 
brought under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as complainant.4 In fact, 
it is the pursuing of trade policies and solving common issues affecting developing 
countries through international instruments that justify the analysis of whether 
developing countries can apply the Brazilian model in order to use the WTO platform 
strategically or not.    
 
                                                
4 See United States – Standards for reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS24 (1995); 
European Communities – Measures affecting Importation of certain poultry products, WT/ DS69 
(1997); Canada – Measures affecting the export of civilian aircraft, WT/DS70 and WT/DS71 (1997), 
Peru – Countervailing duty investigation against import of buses from Brazil, WT/DS112 (1997); 
European Communities – Measures affecting differential and favourable treatment of coffee, 
WT/DS154 (1998); Argentina – Transitional safeguard measures on certain imports of woven fabric 
products of cotton and cotton mixtures originating in Brazil, WT/DS190 (2000); Turkey – Anti-
dumping duty on steel and iron pipe fittings, WT/DS208 (2000); European Communities – Measures 
affecting soluble coffee, WT/DS209 (2000); Mexico – Provisional anti-dumping measure on electric 
transformers, WT/DS216 (2000); Unites States – Continued dumping and subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217 (2000); United States – Countervailing duties on certain carbon steel products from Brazil, 
WT/DS218 (2000); European Communities – Anti-dumping duties on malleable cast iron tube or pipe 
fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219 (2000); Canada – Export credits and loan guarantees for regional 
aircraft, WT/DS222 (2001); Unites Sates – US patents code, WT/ DS224 (2001); United States – Anti-
dumping duties on silicon metal from Brazil, WT/DS239 (2001); Argentina – Definitive Anti-dumping 
duties on poultry from Brazil, WT/DS241 (2001); United States – Equalizing excise tax imposed by 
Florida on processed orange and grapefruit products, WT/DS250 (2002); United States – Definitive 
safeguard measures on import of certain steel products, WT/DS259 (2002); European Communities – 
Export subsidies on sugar, WT/DS266 (2002); Unites States – Subsidies on upland cotton, WT/DS267 
(2002); European Communities – Customs classification of frozen boneless chicken cuts, WT/DS269 
(2002); United States – Domestic support and export credit guarantees for agricultural products, 
WT/DS365 (2007); Unites States – Anti-dumping administrative reviews and other measures related to 
imports of certain orange juice from Brazil, WT/DS382 (2008); European Union and Netherlands – 
Seizure of generic drugs in transit, WT/DS409 (2010); and, South Africa – Anti-Dumping Duties on 
frozen meat of fowls from Brazil, WT/DS439 (2012). 
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This study recognizes the importance of Brazil as a new economic power and 
analyzes the evolution of Brazilian Trade Policy in the last forty years.  It further 
describes how developing countries have encountered common issues under the 
international trade legal system, and the way Brazil has promoted and implemented its 
trade policies relating to those issues through disputes brought to the WTO. However, 
the effectiveness of the Brazilian model for developing countries is questioned taking 
into account the limited capacity of Brazil to represent general interests, the particular 
conditions that led to its current economic development, and the disadvantageous 
economic situation of the rest of the third world.   
 
This study is divided into five parts.  Part I is the Introduction to the study. 
Part II describes the development of Brazilian Trade Policy since the Industrialization 
Era up until today, explaining the most important policies and strategies adopted 
during the identified periods.  Part III analyzes particular issues that developing 
countries have faced within the WTO as well as the discussions and negotiations 
carried on these particular matters, focusing on the outcome and achievements 
reached by the third world. Part IV details dispute settlement cases related to common 
issues concerning developing countries within the WTO, where Brazil has been 
involved in order to protect economic interests and critical sectors in accordance with 
its international trade policies. Finally, Part V after considering the role of the WTO 
as agent for economic development, evaluates the impact that Brazilian Trade Policy 
has had and has in the role of developing countries within the WTO framework and 
analyzes whether other developing countries could use the Brazilian model and the 
WTO to pursue their own trade policies and goals. 
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II. History of Brazilian Trade Policy 
 
The development of the Brazilian Trade Policy has been attributed to two particular 
periods: First, a protectionist model that drove Brazil’s economy since its 
Industrialization started in the 1930s, and secondly a trade liberalization model that 
emerged in the 1980s as a consequence of the global financial crisis. 
 
These two periods are part of the Developmentalism model that has been 
followed by Brazil to strengthen its economy over the last 80 years, even though both 
periods differ in how the State applied and perceived the concept of development as 
well as in their characteristics and the trade policies adopted.  
 
This chapter addresses the historical development of Brazilian trade policy 
until today, reflecting the path that Brazil has taken for its successes. It sets out to 
analyze both the National Developmentalism and the New Developmentalism 
strategies that lead to the growth of the Brazilian economy in the twenty-first century.  
 
A. National Developmentalism 
During the Great Depression in the 1930s, developing countries realized the 
importance of protecting their markets from external economic fluctuations, as well as 
the need to strengthen their economies by promoting not only the domestic production 
of primary goods, but also the industrialized products that had been mainly imported 
until that moment.  “From the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, most developing countries 
conceived of development as driven by industrialization policies relying on import-
substitution and growth of domestic ‘infant industries’ (i.e. newly emerging 
industries).”5 
 
                                                
5 Patrick A. Messerlin, Enlarging the Vision for Trade Policy Space: Special and Differentiated 
Treatment and Infant Industry Issues, 29 WORLD ECONO 1397 (2006). 
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Brazil was not an exception and as a consequence, it adopted a Developmentalist 
model based on “import substitution, protection of national industry, focus on the 
market and reduction of an economy’s openness coefficient.”6  
 
Import Substitution Industrialization was characterized by the central role 
given to the State in order to create necessary conditions for the economic 
development of different industries. The principal policy instruments used to promote 
and intensify ISI were among others: high customs tariffs and/or exchange controls; 
special preferences for domestic and foreign firms importing capital goods for new 
industries; preferential import exchange rates for industrial raw materials, fuels and 
intermediate goods; cheap loans by government development banks for favored 
industries; and, the direct participation of government in certain industries, especially 
the heavier industries, such as steel, where neither domestic nor foreign private capital 
was willing or able to invest.7  
 
This model helped bolster Brazil’s industrialization process. However, it 
created distortions in its economy such as the repression of exports,8 the lack of 
vertical integration of the industrial apparatus, and the persistence of social and 
economic inequalities.9 “At the end of the 1970s, this model based on a closed 
economy gave clear signs of being eroded and challenged by the debt and oil crisis 
that ravaged Latin America, and particularly Brazil.”10 
 
B. New Developmentalism 
The transition to a new model started in the 1980s influenced by the debt crisis as well 
as by the “ideological neoliberal wave coming from the United States”11 promoting 
                                                
6 Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Developing Brazil Overcoming the Failure of the Washington 
Consensus, 48 (2009). 
7 Cf. Werner Baer, Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and 
Interpretations, 7 LAT AM RES REV 95 (1972). 
8 See Alice Amsden, Escape from Empire: The Developing World’s Journey Through Heaven and Hell, 
40 (2007). 
9 See Diana Alarcon & Terry McKinley, Beyond Import Substitution: The Restructuring Projects of 
Brazil and Mexico, 19 Latin American Perspectives 72 (1992). 
10 Glauco Arbix & Scott B. Martin, supra note 2, at 8 - 9. 
11 Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, supra note 6, at 50. 
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openness of global markets and removal of major administrative controls.  However, 
it was only in the 1990s that Brazil as well as the majority of Latin American 
countries started to put together and apply the New Developmentalist model.    
 
New Developmentalism was developed on the basis of the State’s role being 
transformed and adapted towards economic development, combined with a 
substantive political reorientation.12  Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira explains the main 
differences between Old and New Developmentalism:13 
 
 
Old Developmentalism 
 
 
New Developmentalism 
State plays a leading role in terms of 
forced savings and investment in 
firms 
State has a subsidiary, but important, 
role in terms of forced savings and 
investment in firms 
Protectionist and pessimistic Export-led and realistic 
A certain complacency toward 
inflation 
No complacency toward inflation 
 
In the international trade arena, New Developmentalism was based on a trade 
liberalization strategy. In the case of Brazil, during the governments of both President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso from 1995 to 2002 and particularly President Ignacio 
Lula da Silva from 2003 to 2011, the Country was given the opportunity to open its 
economy to the world through the stimulation of competition and international trade.  
 
However, this process was relatively slow due to the protectionist tradition of 
the country that prevailed during the previous decades, and the different forces 
converging in the Brazilian scenario.14 First, between 1994 and 1998 there was a 
raised concern from sectors threatened by foreign competition, due to the substantial 
                                                
12 See Glauco Arbix & Scott B. Martin, supra note 2. 
13 Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, supra note 6, at 247. 
14 See Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil’s Trade Policy: Moving Away from Old Paradigms, in Brazil as an 
Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil’s Changing Role in the Global Economy (Lael Brainard 
& Leonardo Martinez-Diaz eds., Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
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tariff reduction that increased the amount of imports. This situation drove the 
government to implement administrative measures to restrict imports, such as cash 
payments requirements for imports financed in less than a year, compliance with 
phyto-sanitary requirements, the need for a license to import a long list of products 
and the implementation of safeguards for the import of textiles and toys.15 
 
Second, there were macroeconomic concerns from policy makers. For 
example, in 1997 the average nominal tariff protection was 4.5 percentage points 
above the tariff registered in 1994 and only in 1999, the average levels of tariff 
returned to those applied in the mid-1990s.16 These forces led to a moderate inversion 
of the trade-opening process. 
 
Cardoso had to face these obstacles and worked on substituting the 
protectionist model through the progressive liberalization of the economy.  This 
strategy was driven by various factors including the international integration that was 
taking place in the world at that time due to the creation of the WTO, as well as the 
new role being played by developing countries in international trade.  For instance, 
Brazil became part of the Group of Twenty (G-20) established in 1999 with the 
mandate to be the premier forum for international economic development promoting 
open discussion between industrial and emerging-market countries on key issues 
related to global economic stability.17 
 
During his presidency, Cardoso also focused on the strength of commercial 
relations with Brazil’s two main economic partners: the United States and the 
European Union.  As a consequence, initiatives such as the negotiation of the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) became a priority.   
 
At the end of Cardoso’s government, Brazil had built an economic foundation 
that would be successfully developed by Lula. In an interview in the last year of his 
                                                
15 Cf. Honorio Kume and Guida Piani, Antidumping and Safeguard Mechanisms: The Brazilian 
Experience, 1988-2003 8 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3562, 2005), available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8991  
16 See Pedro da Motta Veiga, supra note 14, at 8. 
17 See G-20, http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_G20.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
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mandate, Cardoso stated: “Our pillars now are: fiscal responsibility, an emphasis on 
competitiveness and, above all, total transparency as regards the rules of the game. 
Investors, both domestic and foreign, know that Brazil is now a sound economy, with 
well-grounded foundations and a potential for growth unparalleled in any nation at a 
similar stage of development.”18 
 
Brazilian trade policy was as a result more dynamic and adapted to the world’s 
international trade. Subsequently with Lula, Brazil would start a new era that would 
take it to the top of the global economy. 
 
International trade policy under Lula’s government was focused on four areas: 
expansion of Brazilian international trade, particularly exports; promotion of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inside Brazil and abroad; growth and strengthening of 
commercial relations with new economic partners; and, active participation in 
international trade forums in order to protect national interests. 
 
As a consequence of the industrialization process and the liberalization of the 
economy, Brazil’s foreign trade experienced a significant growth since 2003 during 
Lula’s government.  Exports contributed significantly to this positive change, reaching 
its maximum point of 202 billion U.S. dollars in 2010 under the export-led model.19 
 
                                                
18 Interview by Miguel P. Caldas with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in Miguel P. Caldas, President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso on a Decade of Social and Economic Change in Brazil, 16 ACAD 
MANAGE EXEC 8 (2002). 
19 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil, Knowing Brazil in Numbers (June 
2011), available at http://www.mdic.gov.br//sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=2701. 
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This development “has been closely related to a diversification in the range of 
exports in terms of sectors, degrees of value added, and types, which include not just 
simple commodities, but also value-added commodities such as ethanol as well as 
manufactured goods across an increasingly diverse range.”20 For instance, Brazil is 
classified as the second producer and first exporter of ethanol in the world, and as the 
fourth producer and exporter of airplanes worldwide.21 
 
In terms of FDI, Brazilian direct investments abroad increased from 2,0 billion 
U.S. dollars in 2003 to 34,9 billion U.S. dollars in 2010, while FDI in Brazil varied 
from 10,1 billion U.S. dollars to 48,4 billion U.S. dollars during the same period. The 
latter in 2010 was distributed in the following sectors: Agriculture, livestock and 
mineral extraction (34,5%); Industry (36,8%); and, services (28,7%).22 The FDI 
increment was then the result of Lula’s objective to develop foreign investment for a 
more dynamic economy.  
 
One difference between Cardoso and Lula’s international trade policy was the 
approach to trade negotiations in order to decrease dependency on its traditional 
commercial partners while opening new different economic markets.  “The strategic 
                                                
20 Glauco Arbix & Scott B. Martin, supra note 2, at 15-16. 
21 See Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil, supra note 19. 
22 Id.  
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shift of the Lula government in the field of trade negotiations has had three 
characteristics: the downgrading of negotiations with the United States and the EU, 
resistance to negotiating disciplines from the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a 
new priority given to South-South negotiations.”23   
 
According to this premise, Brazil focused on the negotiation of trade 
agreements with other developing countries (see chart below),24 enhancing initiatives 
such as MERCOSUR, the political and trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Paraguay, and opposing proposals such as the FTAA lead by the United 
States. 
 
 
 
The consequence of this strategy was the shift in the main suppliers for Brazil 
and the main markets for Brazilian exports. Since 2008 Asia has been Brazil’s most 
important commercial partner as it is illustrated in the following charts:25    
 
                                                
23 Pedro da Motta Veiga, supra note 14, at 10. 
24 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil, supra note 19. 
25 Id. 
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Ultimately, Lula repositioned Brazil’s role in the global arena with respect to 
multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, Brazil adopted an offensive and 
defensive strategy of its national economic interests, which led the country, as it will 
be explained in the next Chapters, to demand at the WTO - DSU the protection and 
sanction of measures endangering critical sectors of Brazilian international trade.  
 
C. Brazilian Trade Policy Today 
Dilma Rousseff assumed the presidency of Brazil on January 1st, 2011. As a former 
member of Lula’s government, Rousseff had the opportunity to witness the 
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transformation of the Brazilian economy and to work closely on the implementation 
and development of Lula’s socio-economic programs. 
 
As expected, Rousseff has maintained the policies from the previous 
administration with respect to international trade, focusing on the strength and growth 
of key sectors internally and the promotion of foreign direct investment.26 Because the 
Brazilian economy has slowed down since 2011 from its rapid growth, the 
government has reacted with an increased interest to reactivate the economy and 
improve competitiveness by making protectionist decisions such as antidumping 
measures, increased taxes on imported automobiles, and controls and taxes on foreign 
exchange transactions.27 
 
Tax incentives have been issued to stimulate production and consumption, but 
these are mainly focused on the automotive industry marginalizing other critical 
sectors that require government support such as the exporters. Furthermore, additional 
trade agreements have been limited by MERCOSUR, which does not allow the 
individual negotiation of trade agreements by its Members and has not concluded a 
significant alliance in recent years. 
 
Despite this situation, Brazil has been successful in the diversification of its 
markets and products and it continues supporting the liberalization and growth of its 
economy. Rousseff’s government promises to remain active within the different 
international forums and keep working for the consolidation of international trade 
relations with strategic partners such as China. 
  
                                                
26 See Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade of Brazil, 
http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio (last visited May 6, 2013). 
27 See John H. Welch, Brazil under Dilma: Forward, Backward or Status Quo?, in Center for 
Hemispheric Policy - University of Miami, Brazil under Rousseff Task Force Papers (2012), available 
at 
http://www.miami.edu/index.php/chp/task_force_policy_papers/brazil_under_rousseff_task_force_pap
ers/   
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III. Common Issues Relating to Developing Countries within the 
WTO  
 
Under principles of non-discrimination, lowering of trade barriers, transparent 
competition, fair practices and privilege to developing countries,28 the WTO was 
created as a forum to negotiate trade agreements, implement and monitor WTO 
Agreements, support the building of trade capacity for developing countries, and to 
settle trade disputes through the Dispute Settlement System (DSS).29   
 
The WTO was conceived to promote trade liberalization and consequently the 
standards of living of the developing countries via economic development. However, 
despite this intended mandate, the developed world continues to exert a strong 
influence in the international trade landscape, and common issues have arisen for 
developing countries with respect to the approach to critical sectors and also the 
negotiation process of trade agreements. 
 
This chapter sets out to identify main issues encountered by developing 
countries within the WTO. In evaluating the development of discussions and 
negotiations of the international trade legal system led by the developed world, the 
analysis will extend to the role assumed by developing countries and the outcome with 
respect to three particular issues: agricultural subsidies, antidumping, and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS 
Agreement).  
 
A. First Common Issue: Agricultural Subsidies 
Agricultural subsidies have a distorting effect on the sector, not only because they are 
directly related to the type of goods that producers choose to make, resulting in a 
changing market dynamic, but also because subsidies discourage competition and 
encourage over production in the developed world.  
                                                
28 See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm  
29 See World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm  
 14 
Agriculture is a sensitive area for many governments as it concerns both 
farmers and the world’s consumers. In the past, agricultural trade had been excluded 
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), through exceptions and 
waivers such as import quotas or export subsidies, and this treatment led to 
uncompetitive production behind market restrictions and subsidy practices 
worldwide.30  
 
Nevertheless, agricultural matters were included after the Uruguay Round into 
the WTO under the leadership of the Cairns Group,31 whose major negotiating 
objective was agricultural trade liberalization. Developed countries were also 
interested given that some of them were major exporters of agricultural products and 
that they were looking for an expansion of their markets. 
 
The long-term objective after the Uruguay Round was to establish a fair and 
market-oriented agricultural trading system and to initiate a reform process through 
the negotiation of commitments on support and protection and through the 
establishment of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and 
disciplines. The goal was to provide for substantial progressive reductions in 
agricultural support and protection over an agreed period of time.32 
 
Therefore, the Agreement on Agriculture was the first multilateral agreement 
dedicated to the sector and agricultural subsidies were brought into the multilateral 
trading system for the first time. “The agreement does allow governments to support 
their rural economies, but preferably through policies that cause less distortion to 
trade. It also allows some flexibility in the way commitments are implemented. 
Developing countries do not have to cut their subsidies or lower their tariffs as much 
                                                
30 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization), The Uruguay Round: A Giant Step for 
Trade and Development and a Response to the Challenges of the Modern World. 
31 The Cairns Group of Agricultural exporting Countries was formed in 1986 including developed and 
developing countries such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Malasya, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay, in response to the agricultural 
subsidies war that had arisen between the EU and the US, which was eroding the comparative 
advantage of middle-income agricultural exporters who could not offer competing levels of subsidy for 
their own producers. See Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization A very Short Introduction, 68 
(2005). 
32 See World Trade Organization, Agreement on Agriculture pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994. 
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as developed countries, and they are given extra time to complete their obligations. 
Least-developed countries don’t have to do this at all. Special provisions deal with the 
interests of countries that rely on imports for their food supplies, and the concerns of 
least-developed economies.”33 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture targeted three pillars of agricultural trade 
policy: market access, domestic support mechanisms, and export subsidies.34  
 
First of all, to improve market access and regulate trade restrictions 
confronting imports, a tariffication process was implemented in order to convert 
quotas and other types of measures into tariffs. 
 
According to Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Members shall not 
maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required to 
be converted into ordinary customs duties including quantitative import restrictions, 
variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-
tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises and voluntary export 
restraints, except as otherwise provided for in Article 5 (Special Safeguard Provisions) 
and Annex 5 (Special Treatment). 
 
Fundamentally, the tariffication process was envisaged to ensure, via its 
system of tariff-quotas, that market access commitments and quantities imported 
before the agreement took effect could continue to be imported by applying lower 
tariff rates for specified quantities and higher rates for quantities that exceeded the 
quota.35  
 
Secondly, regarding domestic support mechanisms, an Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS) was negotiated.36 AMS is used to assess how much domestic support 
                                                
33 World Trade Organization, Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm  
34 Cf. Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization A very Short Introduction, 67 (2005). 
35 Cf. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap2_e.pdf  
36 See World Trade Organization, Agreement on Agriculture art. 6, 7, Apr. 5, 1994.  
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is being provided for the agricultural sector by the subject country, which directly 
affects production and trade. It categorizes subsidies into four boxes: i) Red box: 
prohibited domestic support measures; ii) Amber box: measures to be cut as per 
certain rates - i.e developed countries agreed to reduce them by 20% over six years 
starting in 1995, developing countries agreed to reduce them by 13% over 10 years 
and least-developed countries were not obliged to make any cuts; iii) Green box: 
allows the use of domestic support measures with minimum impact on trade such as 
government-funded research, direct income transfers for farmers that are not coupled 
with production, structural adjustment assistance, food security, and other support on 
a small scale when compared with the total value of the product or products supported 
which is 5% in the case of developed countries and 10% or less for developing 
countries; and, iv) Blue Box: certain compensation payments for farmers required to 
limit production and deficiency payments. 
 
Finally, export subsidies were prohibited under the Agreement on Agriculture, 
unless the subsidies are specified in a member’s list of commitments.37 “Where they 
are listed, the agreement requires WTO members to cut both the amount of money 
they spend on export subsidies and the quantities of exports that receive subsidies. 
Taking average for 1986-90 as the base level, developed countries agreed to cut value 
of export subsidies by 36% over the six years starting in 1995 and the developing 
countries by 24% over 10 years. Developed countries also agreed to reduce the 
quantities of subsidized exports by 21% over the six years and developing countries 
agreed by 14% over 10 years. Least-developed countries were not required to make 
any cuts.”38 New export subsidies were prohibited by the Agreement. 
 
An important provision included within the Agreement on Agriculture was the 
Peace Clause, under the understanding that i) certain actions available under the 
Subsidies Agreement would not be applicable with respect to green box policies and 
domestic support and export subsidies maintained in conformity with commitments; 
ii) due restraint would be used in the application of countervailing duty rights under 
the General Agreement; and, iii) limits in terms of the applicability of nullifications or 
                                                
37 See id. art. 9. 
38 World Trade Organization, supra note 35.  
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impairment actions were set out. The aim was to reduce the likelihood of disputes or 
challenges on agricultural subsidies over a period of nine years, until the end of 2003. 
 
The outcome of the Uruguay Round was far from satisfactory for developing 
countries, and the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture started getting diverted 
from their objective to reduce trade barriers. Developed countries started using 
sophisticated calculations and introducing complicated definitions to find ways to 
maintain the already existing restrictions and subsidies. “According to the OECD 
(2000), the level of domestic supports given by the developed countries has risen from 
31 per cent of gross receipts in 1990, to 40 per cent in 1997, without any violation of 
the Agreement. The reason is that the Agriculture Agreement allowed countries to 
omit a wide range of different types of domestic subsidy from the calculation of the 
aggregate measure of support. Thus, countries have been able to increase the level of 
their domestic subsidy to farmers by offsetting cuts in prohibited subsidies (the Amber 
Box) with increased subsidies in the other categories (the Green and Blue Boxes) that 
are deemed to be non-trade-distorting.”39  
 
Furthermore, developing countries depending on World Bank and IMF loans 
were forced to cut or eliminate the support payments to the farmers, in the name of 
trade liberalization.   
 
Trade negotiators met at the biennial WTO ministerial meeting in September 
2003 in Cancun to continue with the Doha Round negotiations initiated in 2001. The 
substance of the discussions was based on three issue-areas and included agriculture 
and cotton, both areas of continued dispute between the developed and the developing 
world.  
 
The United States (US) and the European Union (EU or EC) continued with an 
inflexible stance on agriculture trying to include all forms of export subsidy such as 
food aid and export credits, while developing countries proposed large cuts in their 
agricultural subsidies and tariffs including a capping of Green Box subsidies. 
                                                
39 Nigel Grimwade, The GATT, the Doha Round and Developing Countries, in The WTO and 
Developing Countries 11, 21 (Homi Katrak & Roger Strange ed. 2004). 
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However, a new coalition of developing countries led by Brazil and India was 
formed,40 and the G-20 took the discussions towards a new direction.41  
 
The G-20 proposed greater commitments from developed countries. “On 
export subsidies, the G20 proposed the elimination of export subsidies of interest to 
developing countries within a target date and further a commitment to reduce export 
subsidies by a later specified date. References to Special and Differential Treatment 
appeared throughout the proposal.”42 
 
On the Cotton initiative, the US position was not different than their general 
approach on agriculture, which was made clear by their refusal to discuss cotton 
subsidies as proposed for African countries. The final text was closer to the US 
approach, calling for consultations to “address the impact of distortions that exist in 
the trade of cotton, man-made fibers, textiles and clothing to ensure comprehensive 
consideration of the entirety of the sector”. It committed no new resources towards 
financial compensation, and instead only instructed some of the international 
organizations to direct existing programs and resources to economic diversification in 
countries where cotton accounted for a major share in GDP. The disappointment and 
shock of the African countries to this proposal was considerable, and was echoed by 
other countries as well.43  
 
As expected, the conference at Cancun collapsed and the Doha agenda did not 
make any significant progress. “The balance of power in the WTO was shifting, and 
although developing countries were unable to push through their own negotiating 
proposals, they showed that any final agreement would require their active 
participation and consent.”44 
 
                                                
40 See Amrita Narlikar, supra note 34, at 111. 
41!The G-20 group at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial consisted of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. 
42 Amrita Narlikar, supra note 34, at 111 – 112.  
43!Cf. id at 115.  
44 Kent Jones, The Doha Blue Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO, 45 (2010). 
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As stated by the G-20 chair, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorin, Cancun 
will be remembered as the conference that signaled the emergence of a less autocratic 
multilateral trading system.45 
 
Until today, the Doha Round has remained paralyzed with respect to 
agricultural liberalization due to the struggle between developed countries, which are 
not willing to substantially cut agricultural supports, and developing countries, which 
are accordingly required to make radical changes to their agricultural systems 
resulting in a clear opportunity for the developed world to enhance their agricultural 
sectors. “Achieving a significant WTO agreement in agriculture that includes 
developing countries is therefore likely to require some combination of progress in 
agricultural productivity, domestic safety nets, new jobs programs, labor-intensive 
direct foreign investment, and foreign aid.”46 
 
B. Second Common Issue: Antidumping  
The adoption and implementation of Anti-dumping (AD) policies and measures has 
been allowed since the 1947 GATT.47 However, it was only in 1995 with the 
inception of the WTO, that an Antidumping Agreement48 (ADA) came out to establish 
a common set of rules applicable to all WTO members, to provide a detailed guidance 
for countries to implement and administer AD laws, and to address potential disputes 
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.49 
 
Dumping is said to occur if a product is exported at a price lower than the 
price it is normally charged for it in the home market of the exporting country.50 
                                                
45 Cf. Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of 
International Trade Negotiations, xxii (2003). 
46 Kent Jones, supra note 44, at 46. 
47 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, 1947, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm  
48 See World Trade Organization, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm#ftnt1 [hereinafter Antidumping 
Agreement]. 
49 Cf. Chad P. Bown, The WTO and Antidumping in Developing Countries, 20 ECON POLIT 255, 263 
(2008). 
50 See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 48, art. 2.1  
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Under the ADA, governments are allowed to act against such dumping by adopting 
AD measures, with the previous undertaking of an investigation and consideration of 
economic evidence to determine its existence, degree and effect.  
 
According to Article 5.2 of the ADA, any application alleging dumping and 
initiated by or on behalf of a domestic industry51 shall include evidence of (a) 
dumping, (b) injury and (c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged 
injury. 
 
An important aspect of the process is that petitioners must be able to show that 
dumping is causing or threatening to cause ‘material injury’ to the competing 
domestic industry. The determination of injury by the investigating authorities, as 
established in Article 3.1 of the ADA, shall be based on positive evidence and involve 
an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect 
of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the 
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products. 
 
When considering the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry, 
the Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of relevant economic factors and indices 
having a bearing on the state of the industry that shall be evaluated, including actual 
and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on 
investments or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude 
of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, 
inventories, employment, wages, growth, and ability to raise capital or investments.52 
 
At the end, the authorities of the importing Members are responsible to decide 
whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements for the 
imposition have been fulfilled, and whether the amount of the anti-dumping duty to be 
imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less.53  
 
                                                
51 See id. art. 4 Definition of Domestic Industry.!
52 See id. art. 3.4. 
53 See id. art. 9.1. 
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After 1995, developing countries started to become frequent users of the WTO 
sanctioned AD trade policy instrument, displacing the four historical developed-
economy users of AD – the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia, 
which used to represent 73.1% of the total number of antidumping investigations.54 As 
Chad P. Bown illustrates below, a sizable share of the global use of AD – 39.5% - has 
been recently allocated to “new user” developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela.55 
 
 
 
Nowadays, developing countries are using the Agreement as active actors to 
protect their key industries from the developed world, and also as one of the few 
safeguard instruments allowed within the WTO for import restriction given that 
multilateral commitments have limited their ability to implement constraining 
policies. In addition, some authors56 are of the opinion that AD has helped developing 
                                                
54 See Chad P. Bown, Global Antidumping Database 2012, available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad  
55 Chad P. Bown, supra note 49, at 256 
56 See J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogues, World Bank, Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin 
period, when the four historical developed-economy users initiated almost
75% of all AD investigations.
Within these nine developing countries, which industries use AD to pursue
protection from imports? Table 2 presents one way to address this question
by reporting information from 1995–2002 on the number of years in which
each three-digit ISIC industry in each developing country initiated at least
one AD investigation and received import protection under at least one
newly imposed measure. While the steel and chemical industries sought and
received AD protection across each country during the sample, most of the
28 different three-digit ISIC industries also pursued AD in at least one of
TABLE 1 COUNTRY USE OF ANTIDUMPING UNDER RECENT GATT AND WTO PERIODS
Country
GATT period,
1985–1994
WTO period,
1995–2004
Number of
antidumping
investigations
Number of
antidumping
investigations
Number of
antidumping
measures imposed
‘‘New user’’ developing countries in the empirical analysis
Argentina 44 192 139
Brazil 58 116 62
Colombia 11 23 11
India 9 400 302
Indonesia 0 60 23
Mexico 123 79 69
Peru 11 55 34
Turkey 74 89 77
Venezuela 6 31 25
Subtotal 336 1,045 742
(share of total) (16.2%) (39.5%) (44.8%)
‘‘Historical’’ users of antidumping
Australia 447 172 54
Canada 223 133 80
European Union 364 303 193
United States 475 354 219
Subtotal 1,509 962 546
(share of total) (73.1%) (36.4%) (33.0%)
Other WTO Members 220 639 368
(share of total) (10.7%) (24.1%) (22.2%)
Total 2,065 2,646 1,656
Notes: The unit of observation for this table is a product-level, foreign country-specific anti-
dumping investigation or measure.
Source: Data for the 1985–1994 use of antidumping are taken from Zanardi (2004, Table 2).
Data for the 1995–2004 initiations and measures used in this table are taken from WTO
(2005a, 2005b).
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countries by being an escape valve to manage an overall program of trade 
liberalization, increasing the willingness to take on more extensive liberalization than 
it would take on without such an option.57  
 
Article 15 of the ADA recognizes a special status that developed countries 
must give to the situation of developing countries when considering the application of 
anti-dumping measures under the Agreement. Nevertheless, the AD mechanism is not 
always used in the best interest of the developing world.  
 
First of all, the requirements under the Agreement allow for substantial 
government discretion to decide whether the dumping is causing material injury to the 
domestic industry.  
 
During a dumping investigation, while a wide range of factors to be analyzed 
are provided, these are not always taking into account in the same way or properly 
evaluated by the authorities in the importing country, who end up constructing 
evidence under their own criteria.58 For instance, “investigating authorities in the 
United States and European Union take into account both the share imports from the 
country under investigation as well as the growth in these imports when determining 
whether the imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. In contrast, 
authorities in Argentina, Canada and Peru appear to rely more on the share imports 
from the country under investigation.”59 
 
Secondly, AD regulations are not at all times aligned with the anti-trust law 
that would apply to internal investigations, which place the accused exporters in clear 
disadvantage because they are subject to more broad standards that determine their 
responsibility. “The definitive analysis of the latter point was an extensive review by 
                                                                                                                                       
American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire (2005); Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael M. 
Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond (3rd ed. 2009). 
57 Cf. Chad P. Bown, supra note 49, at 285 - 286 
58 See Lindsey Brink, Cato Institute, The US Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality, 7 TRADE 
POLICY ANALYSIS 1 (1999), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/us-
antidumping-law-rethoric-versus-reality.  
59 Kara M. Reynolds, From Agreement to Application: An Analysis of Determinations under the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement, 17 REV INT ECON 969, 969 – 970 (2009). 
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the OECD of antidumping cases in Australia, Canada, the European Union and the 
United States. The review found that 90 per cent of the instances of import sales found 
to be unfair under antidumping rules would never have been questioned under 
competition law, i.e., if used by a domestic enterprise in making a domestic sale. 
Much less than ten per cent of the antidumping cases would have survived the much 
more rigorous standards of evidence that applies under competition law.”60  
 
The consequence of these differences across countries with respect to AD 
measures is that antidumping investigations may be biased against certain trading 
partners by the use of particular methodologies or procedures to determine the level of 
dumping. Developing countries can face a disadvantaged situation because of their 
industries’ lack of resources or knowledge to defend themselves successfully during 
the course of an investigation, and also because countries may be more likely to 
impose protection measures against them considering their limited ability to 
retaliate.61 
 
In a nutshell, the implementation of AD regulations and the investigation 
process vary from one country to the other, with the only requirement being to remain 
consistent with the principles of the ADA. Essentially, the WTO framework becomes 
only a base for the development of distinct AD structures provided by each Member 
country, that is not at all times beneficial to the developing world.  
 
C. Third Common Issue: The TRIPS Agreement and Patent Protection on 
Pharmaceutical Products 
Upon the signing of the agreement instituting the WTO in 1994, Members adhered to 
different binding treaties on trade in goods and services annexed to the convention,62 
including the TRIPS Agreement.  
                                                
60 J. Michael Finger, Francis Ng & Sonam Wangchuk, Antidumping as Safeguard Policy  7 (World 
Bank, Working Paper No. 2730, 2001), available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2730  
61 Cf. Kara M. Reynolds, supra note 59, at 973. 
62 World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods including GATT 1994; Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement 
 24 
The TRIPS Agreement today constitutes the most comprehensive multilateral 
agreement on intellectual property.  It introduced global minimum standards that all 
Member States shall comply with, through national legislations for promoting 
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, including those for 
patents.63   
 
Developed countries presented the negotiation on TRIPS as a necessary 
condition to promote innovation and to stimulate technology and capital flows to 
developing countries. The assumption was that people from developed and developing 
countries will benefit from intellectual property rights (IPRs).64  
 
However, the standards established by TRIPS were clearly suitable for 
developed countries with strong industrial sectors and technological capabilities to 
trade goods that would be subject to IPRs protection. This caused an increase in the 
costs of essential products such as pharmaceuticals and made the developing world 
dependent on innovation that it could not afford, reducing its competitiveness in the 
international trade arena. 
 
Taking into consideration this particular situation for developing and least-
developed countries (LDCs), and the challenges they could face to implement the 
TRIPS Agreement, a transitional period to put in place a product patent regime for 
technology and products such as pharmaceuticals was conferred until 2005 and 2016 
respectively.65  
 
In addition, various flexibilities and public health safeguards were adopted 
including: 
                                                                                                                                       
on Technical Barriers to Trade; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Agreement on 
Preshipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of Origin; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; and, Agreement on Safeguards GATS, Apr. 15, 
1994. 
63 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
64 Cf. Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options, 23 (2002). 
65 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 63, Part VI Transitional Arrangements. 
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• Parallel imports (Article 6) 
Under the legal principle of “exhaustion”, Members can decide if a product 
manufactured legally overseas is imported without the consent of the patent 
owner when it has been sold previously in the global market. As a consequence, 
even though the patent owner maintains the exclusive right to manufacture the 
product, the resale to other countries cannot be prevented under intellectual 
property rights because the patent rights have been exhausted.  
 
• Experimental use (Article 30) 
Use of patented inventions for research purposes. 
 
• Bolar exceptions (Article 30) 
This allows manufacturers of generic products to use, without the authorization 
of the patent owner, the patented invention for marketing approval purposes 
prior to patent expiration. 
 
• Compulsory Licensing (Article 31) 
When the law of a Member allows the government or third parties authorized by 
the government to manufacture, use, sell or import a product under patent 
protection without the authorization of the patent owner, under the requirements 
established in the TRIPS Agreement. 
All developing countries could have made use of these flexibilities or extended 
periods but this was not the case, and as expected they experienced difficulties in 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement, which begged a further analysis of the real 
impact of the new system on national legislations and public interests. 
 
The Doha Declaration  
Patents on medicines have been one of the most debated matters since the adoption of 
the TRIPS Agreement given its direct impact on public health. Since its 
implementation, the obligation to grant patent protection to pharmaceutical products 
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and process inventions has been established,66 and with it public health policies got 
affected, particularly in those countries that did not grant any form of protection to 
pharmaceutical products in the past.  
 
A political consensus about the rights given by TRIPS Agreement to protect 
public health and the access to medicines in the developing world was only articulated 
in the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
“Developing countries sought to clarify — through adoption of the Doha Declaration 
— that the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement did provide sufficient flexibility and 
discretion to ensure access to medicines in the interests of public health.”67 
 
During the 2001 WTO round of trade discussions in Doha, Qatar, a coalition 
was created among developing countries in order to discuss the need for greater 
TRIPS flexibilities. As expected, the United States aligned with multinational 
pharmaceutical companies opposed the inclusion of parallel importation of 
pharmaceutical products and liberal compulsory licensing policies.  
 
Interestingly, one completely unexpected event changed the global political 
landscape in this regard. After the US World Trade Center attack in September 2001, 
a potential bio-terror attack with anthrax was considered and the US Secretary of 
Health and Human Services under the threat of issuing a compulsory license, 
persuaded the pharmaceutical Bayer to lower its drug prices on Ciprofloxacin. The 
United States subsequently found itself in the awkward position of threatening to issue 
a compulsory license while trying to restrict compulsory license use in developing 
countries fighting the AIDS epidemic.68 Finally, a text favoring developing countries 
proposal was approved. 
 
                                                
66“1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced”. Id. art. 27 Patentable Subject Matter. 
67 World Health Organization, Intellectual Property Protection: Impact on Public Health (2005), 
available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/AccesstoMedicinesIPP.pdf. 
68 Cf. Amy Nunn, The Politics and History of AIDS Treatment in Brazil, 137 (2009) 
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In the Doha Declaration69 it was agreed that the TRIPS Agreement does not 
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all. Also, it was recognized that each 
member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which licenses are granted. Practice shows that these are issued 
generally on grounds of general interest, such a public health.  
 
Members were also given the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, and the freedom to establish its 
own regime for exhaustion of intellectual property rights subject only to the most 
favored nation and national treatment provisions. 
 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement established the option to issue 
compulsory licenses for the local manufacturing of patented products, predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use. This 
restriction meant that countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity were 
not going to be able to use a compulsory license as a source of affordable medicines. 
 
This difficulty was recognized in the Doha declaration and the Council for 
TRIPS was instructed to find a solution to the problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002. 
 
As a consequence, the General Council of the WTO adopted the Decision of 
August 30th, 2003 (WT/L/540), which authorizes WTO Members to grant compulsory 
licenses for the production and export of generic medicines to developing countries 
and least developed countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector. This Paragraph 6 was formalized as an amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement in 2005.70  
                                                
69 World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov.14, 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.  
70 Cf. UNAIDS, WHO & UNDP Policy Brief, Using TRIPS flexibilities to improve access to HIV 
treatment (2011), available at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2011/JC2049_Polic
yBrief_TRIPS_en.pdf 
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Finally, paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration exempted least developed 
countries from having to grant patents and from providing for the protection of 
undisclosed information with respect to pharmaceutical products until January 1st, 
2016. In November 2005, the WTO TRIPS Council extended the transition period for 
least developed countries from mandatory compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
other than the provisions providing for non-discriminatory treatment, until July 2013. 
 
D. Conclusion 
The developing world continuously faces economic and international trade pressures 
by developed countries, which become evident in the permanent and ongoing 
discussions and negotiations of critical sectors within the WTO. 
 
In recent years, developing countries have obtained some protection and 
special treatment at the international level not only for their evident situation of 
disadvantage in terms of development, but also because they have come together and 
stood up in opposition to dominant countries within the WTO. Nevertheless, common 
issues continue to present themselves and developing countries seem not to be ready 
to give up on the policies and strategies that have allowed them to grow and empower 
their economies.    
 
It is important to mention that there are sectors such as agriculture and IPRs, 
which despite the special and differential treatment they receive, remain on the agenda 
of developing countries as critical sectors to be discussed in the negotiation process. 
 
For example, as it is explained by Constantine Michalopoulous in his book 
Developing Countries in the WTO (2001), the purpose of TRIPS agreements on 
patents, copyrights and related IPRs issues is to standardize minimum IPRs protection 
worldwide, and thereby extend it to sectors not previously covered in developing and 
some developed countries. 
 
However, the main potential costs of TRIPS to developing countries are the 
economic losses that might be suffered by their consumers and producers, and the so-
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called ‘deadweight’ efficiency losses from reduced competition.71 Under this scenario, 
IPRs remain as a critical issue to be negotiated within the WTO by developing 
countries, considering that as a group they are certain to suffer increased costs with 
the introduction of patents involving stronger IPRs protection. 
 
This chapter explained how developing countries have been permanently 
confronting issues within the WTO through the discussion and negotiation of 
agreements. Nevertheless, they can also activate the dispute settlement system in order 
to bring particular cases affecting economic interests to the decision of an 
international body, as will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
  
                                                
71 See also Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or 
Myth? (1987)  
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IV. The Dispute Settlement System and Brazilian Cases on Common 
Issues Relating to Developing Countries within the WTO 
 
Disputes in the WTO essentially involve violation of previously agreed upon trade 
rules. Therefore, States use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of 
taking action unilaterally, which means abiding by the agreed procedures, and 
respecting judgment outcomes.72 
 
A dispute arises when one country adopts a trade policy measure or takes some 
action that one or more WTO members consider to be in breach of WTO agreements, 
or in a member’s failure to live up to its obligations. 
 
Settling disputes is the responsibility of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 
which consists of all WTO members. The DSB has the sole authority to establish 
“panels” of experts to consider the case, and to accept or reject the panels’ findings or 
the results of an appeal.  
 
Trade disputes are channeled into the WTO’s dispute settlement process with 
the objective to conform States’ trade policies to WTO agreements while preserving 
international trade law. It is interesting to note that only economic groups and 
powerful States such as the United States, the European Union and Canada access the 
DSS repeatedly to obtain decisions that in the majority of the cases benefit their own 
economic interests.73 
 
This chapter sets out to examine how Brazil has been directly involved in trade 
disputes with developed countries, regarding some of the main issues that the 
developing world faces within the WTO.  The chapter begins with a brief background 
of Brazil’s participation in the dispute settlement system, and later presents particular 
cases related to agricultural subsidies, antidumping and the TRIPS Agreement. The 
                                                
72 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf  
73 See World Trade Organization, Map of Disputes between WTO Members, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm and Disputes by Country/Territory, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm  
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chapter concludes with an outlook for developing countries vis-à-vis their usage of the 
dispute settlement system as an important mechanism to challenge the economic 
power of the developed world.  
 
A. Background  
Brazil is globally recognized as the most successful developing country using the 
WTO dispute settlement system to achieve its international trade and economic 
objectives. Until 2012, Brazil had taken 26 cases before the WTO as a complainant, 
obtaining in the majority of them a positive outcome. “Overall, Brazil has been the 
fourth most frequent complainant in the WTO dispute settlement system after the 
United States, the European Union, and Canada.”74 
 
Complaints have been primarily related to the main export markets for 
Brazilian products, which involve cases against commercial partners that are world 
economic powers such as the United States and the European Union.75   
 
In April 1995, Brazil filed its first WTO case as a complainant: Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS4) against the United States. “The 
U.S. regulations affected one of Brazil’s largest exporters, the state-owned company 
Petrobras, and Venezuela had already filed a WTO complaint against the U.S. 
regulations, spurred by its own state-owned oil company,”76 which motivated 
Brazilian participation in the process.  
 
The dispute concerned the implementation by the United States of its domestic 
legislation known as the Clean Air Act of 1990 and, more specifically, to the 
regulation enacted by the United States' Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to 
that Act, to control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline 
manufactured in or imported into the United States. This regulation was formally 
                                                
74 Gregory Shaffer, Micelle R. Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What 
Lies behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT LAW J 413 (2008) 
75 See Daniel Arbix, Contenciosos brasileiros na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC): pauta 
comercial, política e instituições, 30 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL 655 (2008). 
76 Gregory Shaffer, Micelle R. Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, supra note 74 at 457.  
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entitled "Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives - Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline", Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and 
was commonly referred to as the Gasoline Rule.77 
 
According to the Request for Consultations, the Government of Brazil 
believed that the Gasoline Regulation was inconsistent with the United States' 
obligation to provide national treatment, as interpreted in Article III of the GATT 
1994, and applicable to Brazilian gasoline imported into the United States. 
Furthermore, the Gasoline Regulation also violated the United States' obligations 
under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, including the requirement to 
ensure that in applying its technical standards to imported products they are accorded 
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin.  
 
The United States based its defense on environmental grounds alleging that it 
was covered under the exceptions established in paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of Article 
XX of the General Agreement.78  However, the report of the Appellate Body upheld 
the Panel’s findings, and established that the baseline rules contained in Part 80 of 
Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations fail to meet the requirements of the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, and accordingly were not justified under 
Article XX of the GATT. 
 
Finally, the United States announced implementation of the recommendations 
of the Dispute Settlement Body, being in this case a successful challenge by Brazil 
and Venezuela of a US measure.   
 
                                                
77 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
78 “Art. XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) entitles Members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) to adopt WTO-inconsistent measures, provided that they fall into one of the 
categories listed herein, each related to a different policy objective, and they are applied in a non-
discriminatory way. In particular, exceptions designed to promote public morals, human (and animal 
and plant) health and compliance with GATT-consistent national norms must be ‘necessary’ to achieve 
the sought objective”. Filippo Fontanelli, Necessity Killed the GATT: Art XX GATT and the Misleading 
Rhetoric about ‘Weighing and Balancing’, 5 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 36, 36 
(2012).  
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In the following years Brazil started a process that allowed it to develop a 
more organized structure not only for the identification, organization and presentation 
of the cases, but also for the integration of the private sector as an active participant of 
Brazilian trade policy.   
 
Brazil also started to play a key role for developing countries, assuming the 
defense of common interests and setting precedents with respect to problems affecting 
the third world in the international trade arena. 
 
B. First Common Issue: Agricultural subsidies 
Brazil over the years became more active at the WTO in order to liberalize global 
markets and obtain protection for critical sectors such as agribusiness. At the time of 
the Doha round, Brazil notably worked towards a multilateral agreement promoting its 
agriculture policies. “In fact, Brazil has been very important in moving the WTO's 
Doha discussions towards a more pro-development outcome simply because of 
Brazil's insistence on serious liberalization in agriculture, particularly in the rich 
countries where tariffs and subsidies are high. This benefits not only Brazil, but also 
other developing countries.”79 
 
Brazil built a solid framework from which to request the protection of its 
agribusiness sector and products as it experienced in the cases against the United 
States and the European Union regarding the elimination of subsidies on upland 
cotton and sugar.   “By the time Brazil brought the U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar 
complaints in September 2002, it had developed significant dispute settlement 
experience. These two cases, however, were considerably more factually intensive 
than the complaints Brazil had filed before. Without the private sector's initiative and 
support, it is unlikely that Brazil would have brought them. The complaints thus 
exemplify how a country can work with its private sector and with lawyers hired by it 
                                                
79 Carina Nucci, World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism, and 
Development, available at http://live.worldbank.org/global-economic-prospects-2005-trade-
regionalism-and-development  
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to bring and win an extremely complex and strategically important WTO case, with 
significant international political implications.”80 
 
In the Cotton Case, Dispute DS267, Brazil requested consultations regarding 
prohibited and actionable subsidies provided to US producers, users and/or exporters 
of upland cotton, as well as legislation, regulations, statutory instruments and 
amendments thereto providing such subsidies (including export credits), grants, and 
any other assistance to the US cotton industry.  According to Brazil, these measures 
were in violation of the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and GATT 1994, causing a serious 
prejudice because of a significant price depression and price suppression in the world 
markets for upland cotton during marketing years 1999-2002.81 
 
 “These Agreements set limits on subsidies equal to the amount prevailing in 
1992. Brazil claimed that (i) during the four marketing years 1999-2002 the US 
provided domestic support to cotton that was in excess of the 1992 limit. These 
subsidies caused serious prejudice to the interest of Brazil under the SCM Agreement 
and (ii) the export subsidies (i.e., export credit guarantees, step-2 payments) are in 
violation of the Agreement on Agriculture.”82 
 
The Panel found: i) that agricultural export credit guarantees are subject to 
WTO export subsidy regulations and three United States export credit guarantee 
programmes are prohibited export subsidies which have no Peace Clause protection83 
and are in violation of those regulations; ii) that the United States also grants several 
other prohibited subsidies in respect of cotton; and iii) that the United States’ domestic 
support programmes in respect of cotton are not protected by the Peace clause, and 
some of these programmes result in serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in the form 
of price suppression in the world market. 
                                                
80 Gregory Shaffer, Micelle R. Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 459. 
81 See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/1 
(Oct. 3, 2002).  
82 John Baffes, The World Bank, Brazil vs. US: Cotton Subsidies and Implications for Development, 
Trade Note 16 (2004). 
83 It established that if domestic support by a member was lower than the level applied in 1992, it could 
not be challenged before the WTO. 
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This decision was appealed by the United States, and the Appellate Body upheld the 
majority of the Panel’s findings regarding the applicability of the Peace Clause; price 
suppression; user marketing (Step 2) payments; and, export credit guarantee 
programs. 
 
At the DSB meeting of April 2005, the United States stated that it would 
comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.  However, on 18 August 
2006 Brazil requested the establishment of a compliance panel that found that the 
United States had failed to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings. 
 
Due to the non-compliance by the United States, Brazil on 6 November 2009 
requested authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations, 
which it was authorized. Brazil notified that starting from 7 April 2010 it would 
suspend the application to the United States of concessions or other obligations under 
the GATT 1994 in the form of increased import duties on certain products when they 
are imported from the United States.  Brazil also informed that it would suspend the 
application to the United States of certain concessions or obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement and/or the GATS. 
 
“On December 21, 2009, Brazil reported to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
that, based on U.S.-supplied fiscal and calendar year data for 2008, it was entitled to 
annual retaliation of $829.3 million, with $561 million covering trade in goods and 
$268.3 million covering other sectors and agreements. At the same time, Brazil 
delayed announcing a final list of sanctioned products as the two countries engaged in 
negotiations on at least a temporary resolution of the dispute. On March 12, 2010, 
however, Brazil notified the WTO that, beginning on April 7, is intended to impose up 
to $829.3 million in retaliation against the United States, $591 million of which would 
consist of tariff increases on various agricultural products, cosmetics, cotton textiles, 
appliances, motor vehicles, and other items. The reminder would involve the 
suspension of unspecified concessions under the Agreement on Trade Related 
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) or the General agreement on Trade in services 
(GATS), or both.”84 
 
Finally, on 25 August 2010, Brazil and the United States informed the DSB 
that they had concluded a Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton 
Dispute at the World Trade Organization. The Framework did not in itself constitute a 
mutually agreed solution to the dispute. It set out parameters for discussions on a 
solution with respect to domestic support programs for upland cotton in the United 
States, as well as a process of joint operation reviews as regards export credit 
guarantees under the program GSM-102. Brazil and the United States also agreed to 
hold consultations not less than four times a year, unless they agree otherwise, with 
the aim of obtaining convergence of views in respect of a solution to the Cotton 
dispute. The Framework also provided that, upon enactment of successor legislation to 
the US Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Brazil and the United States will 
consult with a view to determining whether a mutually agreed solution to the Cotton 
dispute has been reached.85  
 
At the DSB meeting on 23 October 2012, Brazil said that on 30 September 
2012, the 2008 US Farm Bill had expired without the enactment of a successor 
legislation. However, taking into account that the current US agricultural support 
programs remained unchanged, Brazil had decided not to terminate the Memorandum 
of Understanding and the Framework Agreement and would thus not impose any 
countermeasures at this time.  
 
This case was a reflection of the defensive strategy assumed by Brazil to 
protect national economic interests.  At the same time, it created an important 
precedent for the rest of the developing countries that witnessed how the WTO dispute 
settlement system had been effectively applied to challenge one of the largest 
supporters of cotton subsidies in the world, the United States. This example would 
                                                
84 Jeanne J. Grimmett, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases 80 (Apr. 23, 2012). 
85 For the precedents of the case see WTO, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm  
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represent a more assertive stance taken by developing economies within WTO 
agriculture negotiations in the future.  
 
Another relevant case regarding the protection of the agribusiness sector was 
the Sugar Case, Dispute DS266.  This dispute brought to consultations in September 
2002, involved complaints by Australia, Brazil, and Thailand - the "Complaining 
Parties"- regarding export subsidies for sugar and sugar-containing products provided 
by the European Community in the framework of its Common Organization for Sugar, 
under Council Regulation No. 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 and related instruments, 
together the "EC sugar regime". 
 
The sugar regime establishes two categories of production quotas: one for A 
sugar and one for B sugar. These quotas constitute the maximum quantities eligible 
for domestic price support and direct export subsidies. EC intervention price system 
for sugar guarantees a high price for the sugar that is produced within A and B 
production quotas. A sugar is the quantity set for EU consumption. B sugar is a 
reserve quantity, ring-fenced to safeguard against unexpected shortages within the 
European Union. Both A and B sugar can be exported to third countries with the use 
of export refunds, which means export subsidies to the exporters that entitle them to 
claim back the difference between the EU price –at which the European Union is 
prepared and obliged to buy- and the world price.86  
 
Sugar produced in excess of these quotas, called C sugar, cannot be sold 
internally in the year in which it is produced and it is not eligible for domestic price 
support or export subsidies so it must be exported or carried over to fulfill the 
following year’s production quotas.87  
 
Among the complaints, Brazil specifically claimed that: i) the EC was 
providing export subsidies above the EC’s commitment levels specified in Section II 
                                                
86 See Tim Rice, Farmgate: the Developmental Impact of Agricultural Subsidies, in The WTO and 
Developing Countries 257, 278 - 279 (Homi Katrak & Roger Strange ed. 2004).      
87 See Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, 
WT/DS266/1 G/L/570 G/AG/GEN/53 G/SCM/D48/1 (Oct. 1, 2002).  
 38 
of Part IV of its Schedule of Concessions,88 contrary to Articles 3.3, 8, 9.1 (a) and (c), 
and 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and Articles 3.1 (a) and 3.2 of the SCM 
Agreement; ii) the EC’s common organization of the sugar market allowed exporters 
of C sugar to export the same at prices below its total cost of production; and, iii) the 
EC sugar regime accorded less favorable treatment to imported sugar because contrary 
to the EC quota sugar, this is not eligible to benefit from the high intervention price 
guaranteed by that regulation in violation of Articles III:4 and XVI of GATT 1994. 
 
Upon request of the Complaining Parties, the Panel was established on 29 
August 2003 and concluded in a report circulated on October 15, 2004 that the 
European Communities, through its sugar regime, had acted inconsistently with its 
obligations under Article 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture, by providing 
export subsidies in the form of payments on the export financed within the meaning of 
Article 9.1(a) and (c) of the Agreement on Agriculture in excess of the quantity 
commitment level and the budgetary outlay commitment level specified in Section II, 
Part IV of Schedule of Concessions (Schedule CXL-European Communities).  This 
decision was appealed by the European Communities but the Appellate body upheld 
the Panel’s findings.89 
 
In June 2005, the European Communities informed the Dispute Settlement 
Body its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings. However, the 
parties were unable to reach an agreement on the reasonable period of time to do it, 
and as a consequence the Complaining Parties requested a binding arbitration to 
determine it. The reasonable period of time was established in 12 months and 3 days 
expiring on 22 May 2006.90 
 
                                                
88 The commitments that are specified in Part IV, Section II, of a Member's Schedule describe for each 
product or group of products concerned, the maximum quantities in respect of which export subsidies, 
as defined in Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture, may be provided, as well as the associated 
maximum levels of budgetary outlays. These commitments are made an integral part of the GATT 1994 
under Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
89 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, 
WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005).  
90 See Arbitration under Article 21.3c of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/33, 
WT/DS266/33, WT/DS283/14 (Oct. 28, 2005). 
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On 24 May 2006 the European Communities submitted a Second Status 
Report regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings.91 The 
EC informed that on the basis of different legal provisions adopted by the 
Commission Regulation, it was then in the position to maintain its subsidized exports 
of sugar within its commitments as from the marketing year 2006/2007, as well as 
applied on a pro rata basis for the remaining of the marketing year 2005/2006. 
 
On 8 June 2006, Australia, Brazil and Thailand informed the Dispute 
Settlement Body that they had reached an Understanding under Article 21 and 22 of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding with the European Communities.92  In the 
Understanding signed between Brazil and the EC, it is mentioned that Brazil has made 
known to the European Communities that it is not satisfied with the measures adopted. 
As a consequence, the parties reached an agreement with regard to future procedures 
within the dispute, establishing among others that Brazil is entitled at any time to 
request the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. 
 
In a nutshell, Brazil has actively participated with a particular interest in the 
Doha Round negotiations to promote both changes to the legal framework and a real 
liberalization of agriculture in favor of the developing world, considering the 
deficiencies of the current system. The main target during the discussions has been the 
agricultural subsidies that the US and the EC permanently use in levels that affect 
international trade and that place in clear disadvantage farmers from the third world 
who cannot receive the same state support as their competitors in developed markets.    
 
However, despite the fact that negotiations have not evolved, Brazil has 
enacted an interesting strategy to protect agriculture as a critical sector of its economy. 
The cases presented are a good example of how the Brazilian delegation at the WTO 
has started to challenge particular regulations in developed countries that are 
detrimental, by demanding the fulfillment of obligations acquired within the 
                                                
91 See Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings, European 
Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/35/Add.1, WT/DS266/35/Add.1, 
WT/DS283/16/Add.1 (June 2, 2006). 
92 See e.g. Understanding between Brazil and the European Communities, European Communities – 
Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS266/36 (June 9, 2005). 
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international trade legal system. In that process, Brazil has succeeded not only in 
limiting export subsidies in the US and the EC in the short term, but also in modifying 
some of their forward-looking agricultural policies as we saw it with the non-renewal 
of the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 US Farm Bill) in the US 
and the reform of the EC sugar sector93 in the EC.  
 
At the end, all these achievements benefit developing countries being affected 
by agricultural subsidies in particular commodities, and generate a positive precedent 
for future negotiations. 
 
C. Second Common Issue: Antidumping 
The Antidumping Agreement of the Uruguay Round was implemented by Brazil in 
March 1995. The country currently carries out antidumping investigations through its 
Department of Commercial Defense – DECOM, which constitutes part of the 
Secretariat for Foreign Trade – SECEX under the Brazilian Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Foreign Trade. 
 
In Brazil as in the rest of the world, the major users of AD are industries 
seeking protection, which usually are of a larger size and subject to substantial import 
competition.94 For example, the chemical industry followed by the metal and plastic 
sectors, together accounted for 73.4% of all the antidumping measures adopted 
between 1995 and 2002 by Brazilian authorities.95  
 
According to Article 17.3 and 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, if any 
Member considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under the 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the achievement of any objective is 
being impeded, by another Member or Members, it may request consultations with the 
                                                
93 See Council Regulation 318/2006 (EC), on the common organization of the markets in the sugar 
sector; Commission Regulation 493/2006 (EC), laying down transitional measures within the 
framework of the reform of the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector; Commission 
Regulation No. 769/2006 (EC), suspending the lodging of applications for export licenses for C sugar 
from 23 May 2006; and, Amending Regulation 493/2006 (EC), as regards the transitional measures 
applicable to C sugar. 
94 See Chad P. Bown, supra note 49. 
95 Cf. Honorio Kume & Guida Piani, supra note 15, at 18.  
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Member or Members in question. In case a mutually agreed solution cannot be 
achieved, and if final action has been taken by the administering authorities of the 
importing Member to levy definitive anti-dumping duties, it may refer the matter to 
the DSB.  
 
Brazil, acting as complainant, has brought AD disputes to the WTO mainly 
against the United States.96 Among the different cases, two will be highlighted, given 
both the fact that Brazil was supported by other developed and developing countries 
until the last instances within the DSU, and their positive outcome: i) Dispute DS217 
for the continued dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 and, ii) Dispute DS382 for 
anti-dumping administrative reviews and other measures related to imports of certain 
orange juice from Brazil. 
 
1. Dispute DS217 
On 28 October 2000, the United States enacted the amendment to the Tariff Act of 
1930, signed under the title of “Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act” –the 
Byrd Amendment.97 The Act instructed the US customs authorities to distribute in 
favor of the petitioners or interested parties, the duties collected from successful 
petitions of countervailing or anti-dumping orders assessed on or after 1 October 
2000. Payments were available as an ‘offset’ for the affected domestic producers 
regarding their qualifying expenditures, including manufacturing facilities, equipment, 
acquisition of technology, acquisition of raw material or other inputs. 
 
In January 2001, Australia, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Thailand and the European Communities, acting jointly, requested consultations with 
the United States regarding the Byrd Amendment, considering that the Act appeared 
                                                
96 See Unites States – Continued dumping and subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217 (2000); United 
States – Countervailing duties on certain carbon steel products from Brazil, WT/DS218 (2000); United 
States – Anti-dumping duties on silicon metal from Brazil, WT/DS239 (2001); United States – 
Definitive safeguard measures on import of certain steel products, WT/DS259 (2002); Unites States – 
Anti-dumping administrative reviews and other measures related to imports of certain orange juice 
from Brazil, WT/DS382 (2008). 
97 Public Law 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A-72, codified at 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2000). Regulations are set 
out at 19 C.F.R. §§159.61-64. !
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to be not in conformity with the obligations of the United States under the GATT, the 
ADA and the SCM Agreement. 
 
The “offsets” constitute a specific action against dumping and 
subsidization, which is not contemplated in the GATT, the ADA or the 
ASCM. Moreover, the “offsets” provide a strong incentive to the 
domestic producers to file or support petitions for anti-dumping or 
anti-subsidy measures, thereby distorting the application of the 
standing requirements provided for in the ADA and the ASCM. In 
addition, the Act makes it more difficult for exporters subject to an 
antidumping or countervailing duty order to secure an undertaking 
with the competent authorities, since the affected domestic producers 
will have a vested interest in opposing such undertaking in favour of 
the collection of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. In the view of 
Australia, Brazil, Chile, the EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and 
Thailand, this is not a reasonable and impartial administration of the 
US laws and regulations implementing the provisions of the ADA and 
the ASCM regarding standing determinations and undertakings.98 
 
The consultations failed to resolve the dispute and as a consequence, the 
complaining states requested in July 2001 the establishment of a panel by the DSB. In 
particular, the Act was alleged to be inconsistent with the obligations of the United 
States under: i) Article 18.1 of the ADA, in conjunction with Article VI:2 of the 
GATT and Article 1 of the ADA; ii) Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, in 
conjunction with Article VI.3 of the GATT and Articles 4.10, 7.9 and 10 of the SCM 
Agreement; iii) Article X (3)(a) of the GATT; iv) Article 5.4 of the ADA and Article 
11.4 of the SCM Agreement; v) Article 8 of the ADA and Article 18 of the SCM 
Agreement; and vi) Article XVI.4 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, 
Article 18.4 of the ADA and Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement.99  
 
At its meetings on 23 August and 10 September 2001, the DSB established a 
single panel in accordance with Article 9 of the DSU to examine the matters referred 
to the DSB by Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, 
                                                
98 Request for Consultations by Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea and Thailand, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217/1 (Jan. 9, 2001) 
99 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Communities, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000, WT/DS217/5 (July 13, 2001). 
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Japan, Korea and Thailand (WT/DS217); and by Canada and Mexico (WT/DS234). 
Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Mexico and Norway 
reserved their third party rights in DS217. Australia, Brazil, Canada –in respect of 
Mexico’s complainant, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico –in respect of Canada’s complainant and Thailand reserved their third party 
rights in DS234.100 
 
In September 2002, the WTO panel decided against the United States on a 
majority of the claims, establishing that the Byrd Amendment was a non-permissible 
“specific action against dumping or a subsidy”, contrary to ADA Article 18.1 and 
SCM Agreement Article 32.1. As a consequence, the Act was also in violation of 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article VI of the GATT 1994.101  
 
The Panel held that the structure of the Byrd Amendment acted against 
dumping by conferring on “affected domestic producers” incurring “qualifying 
expenses” an offset payment subsidy, which would allow them to establish a 
competitive advantage over dumped imports. Also, the Act would have the effect of 
providing a financial incentive for domestic producers to file anti-dumping-
countervail applications, or at least to support such applications in order to establish 
their eligibility for offset payments. 
 
Regarding Article 5.4 ADA and 11.4 SCM Agreement stipulating that there 
must be sufficient support for the application before a Member may initiate an 
investigation, the Panel viewed the Byrd Amendment as operating in such a manner 
that would not allow the US investigating authorities to conduct an objective and 
impartial examination of the level of support by domestic producers, evidencing the 
industry concern of injury caused by dumped or subsidized imports. By requiring 
support for the petition as a prerequisite for receiving offset payments, the Act in 
effect mandates domestic producers to support the application and renders the 
                                                
100 See Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the 
European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Thailand, United States – 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/6 – WT/DS234/14 (Nov. 5, 2001). 
101 Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/R. 
WT/DS234/R (Sept. 16, 2002) 
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threshold test of ADA Article 5.4 and SCM Agreement Article 11.4 completely 
meaningless.  
 
ADA Article 18.4, SCM Agreement Article 32.5 and Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement provide that each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general 
or particular character, to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with the provisions of the respective Agreements. Since the 
Panel found that the Byrd Amendment was inconsistent with ADA Articles 5.4 and 
18.1, and SCM Agreement Articles 11.4 and 32.1, it was considered that the Act was 
inconsistent with ADA Article 18.4, SCM Agreement Article 32.5, and therefore 
WTO Article XVI:4. 
 
In a nutshell, the Panel concluded that the Byrd Amendment was inconsistent 
with ADA Articles 5.4, 18.1 and 18.4, SCM Agreement Articles 11.4, 32.1 and 32.5, 
Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the GATT 1994, and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, 
nullifying or impairing benefits accrued to complainant parties under these 
Agreements.   
 
The US appealed the Panel’s decision, which was upheld by the WTO 
Appellate Body in January 2003, except in the findings referring to the inconsistency 
of the Byrd Amendment with ADA Article 5.4 and SCM Agreement Article 11.4 on 
industry support requirements.102 On 27 January 2003, the DSB adopted the Appellate 
Body Report and the Panel Report as modified by the Appellate Body Report. 
 
On 19 March 2003, the complainants requested arbitration to determine the 
reasonable period of time for implementation by the US of the DSB 
recommendations. The compliance period was subsequently determined by arbitration 
to expire December 27, 2003.103 
 
                                                
102 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). 
103 Arbitration under Article 21.3 (3) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes: Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22 (June 13, 2003) 
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Because the United States did not comply by the December 2003 deadline, 
eight complaining Members –Brazil, Chile, EU, India, Japan, Korea, Canada and 
Mexico- asked the WTO in January 2004 for authorization to impose retaliatory 
measures. The United States objected to the level of suspension of concessions 
proposed by the complainant parties, sending them to arbitration. The remaining three 
complainants –Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand- agreed to give the United States 
until December 27, 2003, to comply.104 
 
On 31 August 2004 the recourse to arbitration by the United States was 
decided,105 and the complainants got the right to impose countermeasures, on a yearly 
basis  “up to a level equivalent to the amount of antidumping and countervailing 
duties collected by the United States on their imports (for the most recent year where 
figures are available), multiplied by 0.72, a coefficient that the arbitrators said 
accurately reflected the value of trade negatively impacted by the Byrd 
Amendment.”106 
 
Since estimated U.S. disbursements for 2003 were U.S.$240 million, the ruling 
would allow imposition by the complaining states of more than U.S.$150 million in 
annual retaliatory duties.107 In late 2004, some of the complaining states received 
authorization from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to impose retaliatory measures.  
 
On February 7 2006, the United States reported to the DSB that on 1 February 
2006, the US Congress approved the Deficit Reduction Omnibus Reconciliation Act, 
which includes a provision that repeals the Byrd Amendment, bringing the US into 
conformity with its WTO obligations. The complainants welcomed these steps, 
nonetheless, they disagreed with the United States that it had brought its measures 
fully into conformity with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. 
 
                                                
104 Cf. Jeanne J. Grimmett, supra note 84, at 27. 
105 See Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, United States – 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Original Complaint by Brazil), 
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA (Aug. 31, 2004) (and associated decisions issued on the same date). 
106 Sean D. Murphy, United States Practice in International Law: 2002 – 2004, 190-191 (2005). 
107 See Daniel Pruzin, EU Japan to Seek WTO Clearance To Impose Sanctions on U.S. Imports, 21 
INT’L TRADE REP (BNA) 1839 (2004). 
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Up until now the EC, Canada and Japan have notified the DSB about the 
suspension of the application of concessions and related obligations under GATT 
1994 on imports of certain products originating in the United States.108 
 
2. Dispute DS382 
On 27 November 2008, Brazil requested consultations with the Government of the 
United States, with regard to: i) certain antidumping administrative reviews as well as 
any assessment instructions and cash deposit requirements issued pursuant to them of 
the United States Department of Commerce –USDOC concerning the imports of 
certain orange juice from Brazil; ii) any actions taken by United States Customs and 
Border Protection -USCBP to collect definitive anti-dumping duties at duty 
assessment rates established in periodic reviews covered by number i), including 
through the issuance of USCBP liquidations instructions and notices; and iii) certain 
US laws, regulations, administrative procedures, practices and methodologies for 
calculating dumping margins in administrative reviews, involving the use of “zeroing” 
and their application in antidumping duty administrative reviews regarding imports of 
certain orange juice from Brazil.109   
 
 Brazil considered that these measures were inconsistent with the obligations of 
the United States under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO and the 
Agreements annexed thereto, including Articles II, VI:1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994; 
Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.1, 9.3, 11.2 and 18.4 of the ADA; and Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement. 
 
In June 2009, Japan requested to join the further consultations, considering a 
substantial trade interest due to the fact that measures at issue appear to be related to 
the imports of orange juice products that Japan exports to the United States. These 
consultations also concerned the continued use by the United States of the “zeroing” 
procedures in its anti-dumping proceedings which Japan challenged in the dispute 
                                                
108 See e.g. Recourse by Japan to Article 22.7 of the DSU, United States – Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/41 (Nov. 11, 2004). 
109 See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and 
Other Measures related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WT/DS382/1, G/L/872, 
G/ADP/D75/1 (Dec. 1, 2008). 
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‘United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews DS322’ and, must 
be brought into conformity with the ADA and the GATT 1994, as required by the 
DSB recommendations and rulings in that dispute.110 
 
Brazil requested the establishment of a panel on 20 August 2009.111 The panel 
was established by the DSB at its meeting on 25 September 2009, and composed on 
10 May 2010. Argentina; the European Union; Japan; Korea; Mexico; the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; and Thailand reserved 
their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third parties. 
 
This case was one more related to the questionable AD practices by the United 
States. Twenty-one WTO complaints against the US have challenged the use of 
“zeroing” by the Department of Commerce. Under this practice, DOC, in calculating 
dumping margins for an imported product, disregards non-dumped sales and thus, 
complainants argue, inflates the dumping margin or establishes a dumping margin 
where one might not otherwise exist.112 The use of zeroing has been found to be 
broadly prohibited in the calculation of dumping margins in U.S. antidumping 
proceedings, both as a general practice and as applied in particular proceedings. 
 
On 25 March 2011, the Panel Report113 was circulated to the Members, finding 
that (a) the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the ADA in using 
simple zeroing to determine the weighted-average margins of dumping and importer-
specific assessment rates under administrative reviews; and (b) the United States 
continued use of zeroing under the orange juice anti-dumping duty order is 
inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
 
                                                
110 Request to Join Consultations by Japan, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and 
Other Measures related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WT/DS382/3 (June 9, 2009). 
111 Request for Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative 
Reviews and Other Measures related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WT/DS382/4 
(Aug. 21, 2009). 
112 Cf. Jeanne J. Grimmett, supra note 84, at 15. 
113 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and Other Measures related to 
Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WT/DS382/R (Mar. 25, 2011). 
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Considering that the United States did not appeal the decision, at its meeting 
on 17 June 2011, the Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Panel report. By 
communication dated 17 June 2011, Brazil and the United States informed the DSB 
the agreement of a reasonable period of 9 months for the United States to implement 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, expiring on 17 March 2012.114 
 
The United States informed the Dispute Settlement Body on 11 May 2012 that 
the US International Trade Commission had concluded on 14 March 2012 a five-year 
sunset review of the anti-dumping duty order on the products covered in this dispute 
and made a determination to revoke the order. In accordance with this determination, 
the US Department of Commerce issued a notice on 20 April 2012 revoking the 
antidumping duty order. As a result of the revocation, imports of orange juice from 
Brazil entered on or after 9 March 2011 are not subject to anti-dumping duties.115 
 
On 14 February 2013, the United States and Brazil informed the Dispute 
Settlement Body of a mutually agreed solution to the dispute.116  
 
As explained above, AD is a very complex mechanism applied differently 
from one country to the other, and it is valid to recognize that Brazil has been 
behaving strategically in the DSS with respect to the cases taken as complainant 
regarding this matter. Developing countries remain concerned about the broader 
application of anti-dumping laws affecting their products and seem to call for a 
toughening of the use of this instrument. However, developed countries and 
particularly the US remain opposed to any restriction for the protection of their 
industries and continue applying doubtful measures assuming the risk to be taken 
before the WTO. 
 
                                                
114 Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews 
and Other Measures related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WT/DS382/9 (June 21, 
2011). 
115 Status Report by the United States, United States – Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and Other 
Measures related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WT/DS382/10/Add.5 (May 14, 
2012). 
116!Joint Communication from the United States and Brazil, United States – Anti-Dumping 
Administrative Reviews and Other Measures related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, 
WT/DS382/12 (Feb. 18, 2013).!
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In this scenario, the rules continue to be the same and further negotiations with 
respect to AD do not seem easy and as such do not constitute the priority for most of 
the countries, including Brazil.  Therefore, the natural solution has been to join forces 
with other affected countries, either from the developed or the developing world, to 
challenge through the WTO complex systems and recurrent illegal mechanisms. At 
the end, the actions of strategic players within the WTO allow some free riders to get 
protection under the international trade legal system, even tough developed countries 
such as the US do not seem ready to stop applying questionable measures in the near 
future. 
 
D. Third Common Issue: The TRIPS Agreement and Patent Protection on 
Pharmaceutical Products 
Brazil has been particularly skillful in negotiating the price of essential patented 
medicines required for the treatment of HIV/AIDS patients with multinational 
pharmaceuticals, threatening them with the use of the flexibilities established on the 
TRIPS Agreements for developing countries.  “Faced with the challenge of carrying 
on its HIV/AIDS program at a considerable higher cost, in 2001 the Brazilian 
government started negotiations with the major pharmaceuticals companies. Backed 
by the threat of compulsory licensing, the government was able to effectively 
negotiate with pharmaceuticals suppliers. The 2001 negotiations resulted in 
substantial reductions in prices: 64.8% for indinavir, 59.0% for efavirenz, 40% for 
nelfinavir and 46% for lopinavir. In addition, a technology transfer agreement was 
established between Merck & Co. Inc. and the Ministry’s main national laboratory, 
FarManguinhos.”117 
 
As a consequence of Brazil’s policies, the United States-based Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturing Association (PhARMA) pressured the US government to 
initiate a trade dispute before the WTO.  On January 8, 2001, the Permanent Mission 
of the United States at the WTO, after prior consultations and a failed resolution of the 
dispute with the Government of Brazil, presented a request to the Chairman of the 
                                                
117 Lea Shaver, Access to Knowledge in Brazil: New Research in Intellectual Property, Innovation and 
Development, 120 (2012). 
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Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for the establishment of a Panel pursuant to Article 4 
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
and Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
 
Article 68 of Brazil's 1996 industrial property law (Law No. 9,279 of 
14 May 1996; effective May 1997), imposes a "local working" 
requirement which stipulates that a patent shall be subject to 
compulsory licensing if the subject matter of the patent is not 
"worked" in the territory of Brazil. Specifically, a compulsory license 
shall be granted if the patented product is not manufactured in Brazil 
or if the patented process is not used in Brazil. In addition, if a patent 
owner chooses to exploit the patent through importation rather than 
"local working," then Article 68 will allow others to import either the 
patented product or the product obtained from the patented process. 
Article 68 of Brazil's 1996 industrial property law discriminates 
against US owners of Brazilian patents whose products are imported 
into, but not locally produced in, Brazil. Article 68 also curtails the 
exclusive rights conferred on these owners by their patents. As such, 
Brazil's local working requirement appears inconsistent with its 
obligations under Article 27.1 and Article 28.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.118 
 
 
On February 1, 2001 the DSB established a panel and Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, India and Japan reserved their third party rights. However, on 
July 5, 2001 the parties notified to the DSB a mutually satisfactory solution on the 
matter establishing that with respect to the interpretation of Article 68, the Brazilian 
Government would commit, in the event it deems necessary to apply Article 68 to 
grant compulsory license on patents held by U.S companies, to hold prior talks on the 
matter with the U.S. government in the context of a special session of the U.S – Brazil 
Consultative Mechanism.119 
 
It is interesting that on the notification to the DSB, the United States expressed 
that its concerns were never directed at Brazil’s bold and effective program to combat 
HIV/AIDS. “This may be attributed to the public relations disaster of the former 
United States Trade Representative threats of trade sanctions against South Africa in 
                                                
118 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent 
Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). 
119 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19, 2001). 
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1999, as well as the fact that Brazil’s strategy to lower the cost of highly active 
antiretroviral therapy had not actually violated the TRIPS agreement. Since article 68 
of Brazil’s Industrial Property Law did potentially violate the TRIPS agreement, it 
was an indirect means of addressing Brazil’s controversial AIDS treatment 
policies.”120 
 
At the time the dispute was settled, Brazil’s strategy to influence international 
institutions and the public opinion regarding the importance to protect the right to 
access to medicines and promote HIV/AIDS programmes had given results, 
pressuring the U.S. government for a mutual resolution of the dispute in order to avoid 
a negative image for its pharmaceutical industry. 
 
The compulsory licensing flexibility mechanism was used for the first time in 
Brazil in 2007. The Ministry of Health engaged in conversations with Merck & Co. 
Inc. to reduce the price of efavirenz, a drug used by 38% of HIV/AIDS patients in 
Brazil. After lengthy unsuccessful negotiations, the government declared efavirenz a 
drug of national public interest and Decree No. 6.108/07 granted a compulsory license 
for the drug’s patents.  
 
The medicine has been imported from India where it is already produced off 
patent and the price dropped from US $1.60 per dose to US $0.45 per dose for the 
generic version. Therefore, with this compulsory license, the government committed 
to the sustainability of its policy of free access to HIV/AIDS treatment and the entire 
public health system.121 
 
As explained above, Brazil has been active on the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement on benefit of the developing world, considering that public health policy 
continuous to be one of its State priority providing financial and governmental 
                                                
120 Amy Nunn, supra note 68, at 128. 
121 See Gabriela Costa Chaves, Marcela Fogaca Vieira & Renata Reis!Accesso a Medicamentos e 
Propriedade Intellectual no Brasil: Reflexes e Estrategias da Sociedade civil. 8 SUR – INT’L J ON 
HUM RTS 173 (2008). 
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resources to promote and achieve major health coverage for the whole population.122   
Brazil not only had success in promoting its policies on public health at the 
international arena level, but also pushed for a change on the interpretation of the right 
to access to medicines for HIV/AIDS treatment as a human right, favoring all 
developing countries.123 
 
The Brazilian strategy of obtaining public support and maintaining a strong 
position with respect to the TRIPS Agreement, has increased the bargaining power of 
the third world and has taken to a positive outcome on the disputes brought by the 
developed world as it was demonstrated in the dispute DS199 initiated by the US. 
Also, it is important to notice that developing or transition economies today constitute 
approximately 75% of the WTO membership, representing a majority that countries 
such as Brazil and India have taken advantage of on matters like this involving a 
growing industry of generics. 
 
In a nutshell, the developing countries succeeded in amending the TRIPS 
Agreement to their favor against the developed world’s will and multinational 
pharmaceuticals’ economic interests, proving the growing ability of developing 
country coalitions to effect the outcome of decisions within the WTO both in the 
negotiation of agreements and dispute cases. The reform to the TRIPS Agreement on 
its own does not solve the health crisis in the developing world. However, it has 
contributed to the efforts to improve their protection under the IPRs system.   
 
E. Conclusion  
The WTO as the world’s meeting point for international trade constitutes an ideal 
scenario for its members to negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements, to discuss 
international trade policies, and, to arrange its differences through a neutral dispute 
                                                
122 See Portal da Saude Brazil, http://portalsaude.saude.gov.br/portalsaude/area/3/saude-para-voce.html 
(last visited May 11, 2013). 
123 E.g., commitments and actions to stop and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS have been set. See 2001 
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS at the UN General Assembly Special Session dedicated to 
HIV/AIDS, The Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS at the UN General Assembly High Level Meetings 
on AIDS in 2006, and the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS at the UN General Assembly High Level 
Meetings on AIDS in 2011. 
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settlement system.  In that sense, the country that “participates in WTO dispute 
settlement affects WTO law’s application and interpretation over time, which in turn, 
can affect domestic regulation and economic decision-making around the world.”124 
 
Through the different cases brought to the WTO and their impact on main 
issues encountered by developing countries in the international trade legal framework, 
Brazil has demonstrated its ability to use the dispute settlement system effectively to 
forward its trade interests setting a favorable precedent for the third world. “Brazil's 
use of WTO dispute settlement and particularly its successful challenges against U.S. 
and EU agricultural subsidy policies have provided a vehicle for Brazil to advance its 
stature and positions in the WTO trade law system.”125  
 
This chapter has shown Brazil as a successful example on how developing 
countries can make a difference in using the dispute settlement system to protect their 
economic interests and promote international trade policies while participating 
actively in the negotiation of critical issues at the international level. However, it is 
necessary to evaluate whether the rest of the developing world shall be able to do the 
same by following Brazil’s example and strategies. This aspect will be analyzed in the 
final chapter. 
                                                
124 Gregory Shaffer, Micelle R. Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 391. 
125 Id. at 421. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
A. The WTO as an Agent for Economic Development 
In the analysis of the WTO’s role as an agent for economic development, usually two 
perspectives are considered: the negotiations of WTO Agreements, including the 
approach to critical issues affecting developing countries’ interests; and, the 
differential treatment given to developing countries within the WTO. 
 
1. Negotiation of WTO Agreements 
As explained in the previous chapters, the negotiation of WTO Agreements is a long 
and complex process influenced by different factors such as the creation of coalitions 
and the adoption of different negotiation strategies. Sonia E. Rolland in her Article 
Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: in Search of Legal Support (2007) 
identifies two broad types of coalitions: i) discussion and research groups, and ii) 
negotiation-oriented coalitions. Indeed each one raises separate legal and institutional 
issues within the framework of the WTO and may use different legal tools to pursue 
their participants' objectives. 
 
On the one hand, discussion and research groups are coalitions focused on 
sharing information and pooling research resources to help the development of 
common platforms and negotiating positions for their members. Robert O. Keohane 
and Joseph S. Nye in their Article Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations (1974) have recognized the importance of these interconnections for 
the formation of coalitions. 
 
On the other hand, the negotiation-oriented coalitions include coalitions 
designed to raise the profile of certain members that would otherwise be under-
represented, coalitions designed to influence the organization's agenda, and coalitions 
designed to pursue specific results in the negotiations triggering the organization’s 
decision-making procedures. This in fact has been the case of the coalitions formed 
between developing countries in order to negotiate agricultural matters (G20) and also 
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the TRIPS Agreement regarding pharmaceuticals, where developing country 
coalitions have been able to successfully stand up against the developed world agenda.  
  
The WTO as an institution, with governing rules and practices, has an 
important impact on the formation and sustainability of developing country coalitions. 
However, as Rolland explains, there are trade law instruments that have a direct 
impact on them. First of all, competition for trade preferences awarded by developed 
countries (most importantly the United States and the EC), have taken to 
confrontations between developing countries with respect to the position to be 
assumed on common issues, which is reflected not only in the negotiation of 
agreements but also on several cases brought to the DSS. Secondly, the offering of 
separate individual deals has been a recurrent strategy to pull apart coalitions. The 
United States, in particular, has played the bilateral card, alongside - or as an 
alternative to - the threat of unilateral sanctions, to create incentives for individual 
countries to defect from coalitions that the United States viewed as promoting agendas 
contrary to its own interests.  
 
Between developed countries, it is possible to perceive an implicit coalition 
when negotiating critical matters within the WTO, as it became exposed on the 
precedents of the negotiations related to the three common issues to developing 
countries explained in Chapter Two. 
 
Another factor influencing the negotiation of WTO Agreements is the 
development of strategies to be applied in the negotiation process with other countries, 
particularly on critical issues affecting developing countries’ interests.  
 
Rolland identifies two major modalities of negotiation strategies: request-and-
offer and formula-based. In a request-and-offer system, countries list the concessions 
(on tariffs or market access) they would like to obtain and offer other concessions in 
exchange. In contrast to the request-and-offer system, formula-based concessions 
require a multilateral agreement (of all members) on the type of cut, its level, and its 
application. 
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Rolland concludes that careful consideration must be given by developing 
countries to the modalities for negotiation in terms of the impact they will have on 
coalitions. On the one hand, formula-based negotiation calls for more multilateralism 
and may result in less flexible results as it happened with the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement in the Uruguay Round. On the other hand, request-and-offer negotiation 
may put countries at the mercy of bilateral divide-and-rule tactics, even though they 
are not forced to accept an offer. 
 
2. Special and Differential Treatment 
With respect to the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) given to developing 
countries within the WTO, Bernard Hoekman, Constantine Michalopoulous & L. Alan 
Winters in their Article Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in 
the WTO: Moving Forward After Cancun (2004), establish that there are currently two 
major dimensions of SDT in the WTO: market access and rule-related.   
 
On market access, SDT involves a call for preferential access for developing 
countries to developed country markets under a Generalized System of Preferences, 
complemented by less than full reciprocity in negotiating rounds.  On rules, SDT 
includes calls for developed countries to provide technical assistance to lower-income 
economies, in order to help them implement disciplines in areas such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, customs valuation and TRIPS, complemented with 
exemptions from certain WTO rules through the principle of non-reciprocity in trade 
negotiations, whereby other developed countries reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to trade. Similar provisions for non-reciprocity are included in Article XIX(2) 
of GATS. 
 
According to the authors, such exemptions may be transitory, and involve 
longer time periods for implementation.  This is the case for example, for the 
implementation of harmonized protection of intellectual property rights under the 
Agreement on TRIPS.  Others are permanent, such as the Article XVIII GATT.126 
                                                
126 Article XVIII allows developing countries to use trade policies in the pursuit of industrial 
development objectives and to protect the balance of payments, imposing weaker disciplines than on 
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Even though SDT is a beneficial instrument for developing countries, as it was 
explained in Chapter Two, the third world faces challenges in applying and benefiting 
from the treatment either for lack of resources, knowledge or bargaining power. A 
good example to reflect this point is the fact that developing countries, even Brazil, 
did not make much use of its flexibilities or extended periods by the time they had to 
implement the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
In assessing the outcome obtained by developing countries within the 
negotiation of agreements or application of SDT instruments, it is clear that the 
developed world continues as the predominant actor influencing both, due to its 
economic power and experience in managing its critical interests within emerging 
economies. Even though this limits the role of the WTO as an agent for economic 
development, the actions of developing countries and particularly key players such as 
Brazil and India have become relevant and effective, creating a new benchmark for 
future negotiations.  
 
There is yet a long way to go in order to obtain real protection for the third 
world on all the different matters discussed and agreed under the WTO. Nevertheless, 
today there exist more examples of coalitions and negotiations producing a positive 
outcome that had not been imagined before.   
 
B.  New Option for the Developing World 
While negotiation of agreements or application of SDT instruments are relevant to 
determine trade-relations between developed and developing countries as well as the 
role of the WTO with respect to emerging economies, an additional instrument has 
strengthened during the last few years. Developing countries, unable to confront the 
developed world only by multilateral agreements, have started using the DSS 
strategically to obtain effective protection under the international trade legal system. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
industrialized countries.  There are also many exhortations to developed countries to take into account 
the interests of the developing countries in the application of WTO rules and disciplines. 
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Among the different literature regarding the WTO dispute settlement system, it 
is probably Marc Galanter in his Article Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change (1974), who gives a better understanding 
of the role of developing countries within the WTO system. 
 
Galanter identifies two kinds of actors in the legal system differentiated by 
their size, the state of their law and their resources: those who have many occasions to 
utilize the courts and to make or defend claims (“repeat players” or “RP”), and those 
who have only occasional recourse to the courts (“one-shotters” or “OS”).  
 
An OS is a unit whose claims are too large (relative to its size) or too small 
(relative to the cost of remedies) to be managed routinely and rationally.  An RP, on 
the other hand, is a unit that had and anticipates repeated litigation, which has low 
stakes in the outcome of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long 
run interests. This analogy can be applied to developing and developed countries 
within the WTO dispute settlement system, to understand the position of emerging 
economies when challenging economic powers for the protection of their international 
trade interests.  
 
According to Galanter, we would expect an RP to play the litigation game 
differently from an OS, considering its advantages: i) RPs having done it before, have 
advance intelligence; they are able to structure the next transaction and build a record; 
ii) RPs develop expertise and have lower start-up costs for any case; iii) RPs have 
interest in their “bargaining reputation” that serves as a resource to establish 
“commitment” to their bargaining positions; iv) RPs can adopt strategies calculated to 
maximize gain over a long series of cases, even where this involves the risk of 
maximum loss in some cases; v) Since penetration depends in part of the resources of 
the parties (knowledge, attentiveness, expert services, money), RPs are more likely to 
be able to invest the matching resources necessary to secure the penetration of rules 
favorable to them. 
 
This position of advantage is a way in which a legal system, formally neutral 
between “haves” and “have-not”, may expand and perpetuate the advantages of the 
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former. However, Brazil has successfully been moving from the “have-not” group 
towards the “haves” exclusive group that uses the DSS permanently and strategically. 
As a key player for the developing world, the Brazilian delegation at the WTO has 
gotten important victories on critical issues affecting the emerging economies.   
 
Brazil has applied what Galanter proposes as an “equalizing reform” with the 
objective to confer relative advantage on those who did not enjoy it before.  It has 
tried to organize the “have-not” party into coherent groups that have the ability to act 
in coordinated fashion, play long-run strategies and benefit from high-grade legal 
services.  This has involved upgrading capacities for managing claims by gathering 
and utilizing information, achieving continuity and persistence, employing expertise, 
exercising bargaining skills and so forth.  
 
An organized group is not only better able to secure favorable rule changes, in 
courts and elsewhere, but it is better able to see that good rules are implemented as it 
was the case on the disputes related to AD measures explained in Chapter Three.  
Developing countries have then a real option to act together within the WTO dispute 
settlement system in order to achieve common economic interests. 
 
However, as it is explained by Gregory Shaffer, Micelle R. Sanchez & Barbara 
Rosenberg in their Article The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies behind 
Brazil’s Success (2008), developing countries generally face challenges if they are 
willing to participate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system because of: (1) 
the lack of capacity to organize information concerning trade barriers and 
opportunities to challenge them, as well as a relative lack of internal legal expertise in 
WTO law, which has a lengthy and increasingly factually contextualized 
jurisprudence, (2) constrained financial resources, including those available to hire 
outside legal counsel to effectively use the WTO legal system, (3) fear of political and 
economic pressure from the United States, the European Union, and other WTO 
members with large markets, resulting in reduced incentives to bring WTO claims 
against these WTO members, and (4) their own internal governance systems. 
 
 60 
In similar fashion, Gary N. Horlick in his Article The WTO and Developing 
Countries (2006) explains how developing countries are prejudiced to deal with 
lengthy processes by lack of capacity to enforce WTO rulings considering that they 
cannot retaliate against larger developed countries and also, by high indirect costs of 
initiating WTO disputes.  
 
Despite weaknesses of the DSS, the positive results obtained in sectors such as 
agriculture and intellectual property rights give hope to long-term implications for 
WTO jurisprudence. In the meantime, by strategically using the dispute settlement 
system, countries such as Brazil will keep helping the developing world, directly or 
indirectly, to achieve this goal.   
 
C. The Brazilian Model 
Brazil has been able to positively influence both WTO regulations as well as the 
dynamics of trade negotiations with world economic powers in a way that benefits 
developing countries.  Furthermore, Brazil is today a good example of how the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO can be used strategically by a developing country to 
achieve and protect its economic interests.  
 
As a consequence, Brazil has assumed leadership of the third world within 
WTO negotiations and litigation, further reinforcing its position as “one of the most 
important players in the twenty-first century’s world economy.”127 Probably the best 
example of this is the fact that this year for the first time, a Latin American and 
representative of a BRIC nation, the Brazilian Roberto Azevedo, has become the head 
of the WTO. 
 
In Brazil’s case it must be noted, as it has been explained in this study, that the 
country experienced particular milestones in the development of its economy and 
international trade policy that allowed it to obtain positive results after its 
                                                
127 Pedro da Motta Veiga, supra note 14, at 20. 
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liberalization process in the 1990s, which differed from the rest of the developing 
world.  
 
Moreover, Brazil has brought cases to the WTO on particular issues affecting 
its interests that could or could not be fully in accordance with the interests and 
critical issues of the rest of developing countries. Therefore, even though Brazil 
represents hope for the third world and has positively influenced the role of 
developing countries within the WTO, the needs, conditions and priorities vary from 
one country to another, making customized strategies to achieve international trade 
policies within the WTO necessary, just as Brazil did.  
  
In conclusion, the WTO DSU remains as an opportunity for developing 
countries to strategically influence global international trade according to their 
economic interests, working together towards common goals.  The success of their 
efforts will depend only on the transformation of trade policies within their respective 
political and economic frameworks, along with the overcoming of the particular 
challenges that will allow each developing country to be a strategic player in both, 
negotiation of the agreements and dispute cases within the WTO.  
